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Abstract 
A widely accepted hypothesis is that concessions demanded by and granted to vested 
interests are responsible for the steady decline in the government financial position. 
We argue that it was rather the supply-side shocks of the seventies combined with the 
political objective of protecting the poor that were responsible. We support our 
argument by examining time series of disaggregated government budget data, and the 
theory of incentives under imperfect information. The latter suggests that price 
controls in the presence of cost shocks would lead to systematic incentives to lower 
quality and investment. And therefore lower tax capacity and the ability to reduce 
poverty in the future. We illustrate these mechanisms at work in power, 
telecommunications, railways, roads, education, and tax collection. The analysis is 
hopeful, however, because if this causal mechanism were understood, a concerted 
attempt to rationalise user charges and improve quality would be more acceptable. 
The process would be helped by macroeconomic policies that keep interest rates low 
and prevent exchange rate volatility, while supply side policies keep inflation low.       
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The Political Economy of the Revenue Deficit 
 
I. Introduction 
India has been trying to reduce the fiscal deficit ever since reforms were initiated in 
1991, but without much success. It has become necessary to ask why. Strong 
medicine can suppress a symptom, but a lasting cure is possible only if the root cause 
is treated. The political economy of India's revenue deficit lies at this root and must 
therefore be understood.  
 
There has been a large amount of work on the political economy of reforms, but the 
dominant explanation for the decay in Indian government finances is still Bardhan's 
(1984) thesis of powerful vested interests each getting concessions such as 
employment, subsidies, free loans, and cheap public goods. Farmers, traders, 
industrialists, bureaucrats, and unionized workers each benefited. If this were the 
whole story government consumption would be rising as a ratio of the Gross 
Domestic Product.  
 
But examining disaggregated data on government budget presents a few surprises. 
Government consumption expenditures as a ratio of the GDP were almost the same in 
the mid-nineties as they were in the mid-seventies. The component of current 
expenditure that has risen is interest payments.  
 
This suggests an alternative view of the political forces that have impinged on budget 
making. The political necessity of lowering poverty1 combined with cost shocks 
initiated the decay in government finances. It is well known that the Indian economy 
faced major supply shocks, such as a rise in oil prices and fall in agricultural output, 
in the seventies. Political imperatives in a poor democracy made it difficult to raise 
user charges for public goods. The result was increasing cross-subsidization, where 
industry and the well off were to pay for provision of services to the poor. This is in 
itself a laudable social objective (apart from catering to dominant vote banks). But it 
had built-in incentives leading to a fall in quality and in investment, as this chapter 
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shows. Since capacity constraints soon appeared, poor quality, time delays, and 
controls, were used as rationing devices. It became increasingly optimal for the rich to 
opt out of the system. Private alternatives appeared to service them. The government 
lost revenue, and the poor suffered non-monetary costs. A humane society requires 
cross-subsidization, but that is viable over the longer term only if the revenue budget 
is balanced and other economic criteria met. The cross-subsidization chosen was 
unsustainable as interest payments on borrowing made to meet shortfalls in revenue 
began adding on to deficits. My argument is different from the common one that 
public consumption must be cut when supply shocks occur. It is not consumption that 
creates problems as much as the perverse incentives that get entrenched when relative 
prices are not allowed to adjust after cost shocks. These harm the quality of provision 
of public services and the revenue raising capability of the government. The irony is 
that alternative policies were available to protect the poor. In section 4 I explore some 
of these. 
 
This analysis of political economy is more hopeful since if powerful vested interests 
exist, there is no reason why they should moderate their demands. But the user 
charges required to improve the revenue deficit will be more acceptable if the adverse 
role of pricing distortions in the face of cost shocks is recognized. Poor quality is as 
much a cost to the poor as high prices. There is evidence that people are willing to pay 
higher prices for better quality (see section 4).  Politicians and bureaucrats are also 
victims of adverse circumstances and policy choices. They suffer from emptying 
coffers and poor reputations. Reorganization can deliver better quality public service 
if the reasons for the decline in quality are recognized and steps taken to reverse them. 
The latter will bring the well off back into the revenue net, and make feasible the 
public investment that can sustain a virtuous cycle of improvement. Because of the 
accumulated debt, a viable long-term lowering of revenue deficit will require 
complementary macroeconomic policies, such as low interest rates and a managed 
exchange rate. In transition the fiscal deficit may have to rise to finance the required 
hike in investment. Some results can be achieved even without investment, as the 
latter requires finance and time. Just as cost shocks initiated the rot, improved 
                                                                                                                                                        
1 A very popular slogan of the Congress Party in the seventies was “garibi hatao”—that is, remove 
poverty. A number of policies were instituted to protect the poor, but unfortunately most of them were 
difficult to administer and created distortions.  
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technology available today can be harnessed to lower costs over a wide spectrum for 
the Indian economy. Falling international oil prices constitute a reverse oil shock, 
which will also help.            
 
The chapter is organized as follows. Section 2 examines historical evidence. Section 3 
then uses theories of incentives under imperfect information to understand the 
motivations and actions of agents that lead to observed outcomes. Section 4 presents 
some of the specific outcomes of this interplay of motivations and then discusses 
policy that is politically feasible and can eventually reduce the revenue deficit. 
Section 5 concludes.    
2. Is the Government Profligate or is it Cash Starved? 
In this section, budget data2, starting from the seventies, are divided by GDP at 
market prices, in order to reveal trends. Tables 1 to 4 present the ratios for selected 
years, while the trends from 1970-71 can be seen in figures 1 to 8. The diagnostic 
table 1 allows us to clearly identify the pathology. The diagnosis is confirmed using 
more detailed data and time series analysis.  
 
Table and figure 1 show that the savings of government administration turned 
negative in the early eighties, while those of departmental enterprises and non-
departmental enterprises increased marginally in the eighties. The latter two could not 
compensate for the decline in the first component. Also capital formation in all three 
was falling by the late eighties (table 1 and figure 2). Compensation of employees, as 
a percentage of GDP increased steadily and in 1987-88 exceeded its 1970-71 level by 
about 2.5 per cent; but it began to fall after that (table 1 and figure 3). The ratio of net 
purchase of commodities and services in 1995-96 was the same as in 1970-71. Vested 
                                                     
2 The public sector comprises (i) government administrative departments, (ii) departmental enterprises 
like the railways, posts and telegraphs, other communication enterprises, and other departmentally run 
enterprises, and (iii) non-departmental enterprises (a) financial and (b) non-financial, which are wholly 
or mainly government-owned companies and public corporations. Administrative departments 
including defence services are said to constitute the general government comprising central and state 
governments, union territories, and all layers of local bodies and panchayati raj institutions. 
Administrative departments include those of central and state governments as well as local bodies . The 
data are the most updated available in the NAS, CSO. 
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interest groups in government were not able to maintain their consumption and the 
government cut back on investment. 
  
Table 1: DOMESTIC SAVINGS BY TYPES OF INSTITUTIONS AT CURRENT 
PRICE 
Domestic savings by Pub. Sector Capital formation by  
Year Govt. 
Adm. 
Dept. 
Enterprises 
Non-dept. 
enterprises 
Govt. 
adm. 
Dept. 
enterprises
Non-dept. 
enterprises
Compensation 
of employees 
in Govt. adm.  
Net purchase 
of commodities 
and services in 
Govt. adm. 
1960-61 2.2 - 0.4 - - - 4.7 1.9 
1970-71 1.3 0.7 0.9 8.1 11.7 18.8 5.5 3.3 
1971-72 1.1 0.7 0.9 9.3 12.4 17.9 5.8 3.9 
1972-73 1.0 0.6 1.0 12.5 14.0 17.9 5.7 3.6 
1973-74 1.5 0.3 1.1 11.2 10.7 18.8 5.3 3.0 
1974-75 2.0 0.3 1.3 11.1 11.0 23.0 5.5 2.8 
1975-76 2.7 0.5 1.1 10.1 11.6 31.3 5.9 3.4 
1976-77 2.5 0.8 1.7 8.4 11.8 30.6 6.0 3.6 
1977-78 2.2 0.8 1.4 6.3 11.9 21.5 5.8 3.3 
1980-81 1.9 0.2 1.4 10.6 11.4 19.3 6.6 3.1 
1984-85 -0.1 0.3 2.6 11.0 12.2 28.0 7.2 3.4 
1990-91 -2.8 0.7 3.1 7.5 7.9 23.2 8.0 3.7 
1991-92 -2.1 0.7 3.3 8.1 8.0 24.2 7.9 3.4 
1992-93 -1.9 0.7 2.8 7.8 8.4 20.8 8.0 3.2 
1993-94 -3.3 0.9 3.0 8.2 9.5 21.8 7.7 3.5 
1994-95 -2.6 1.0 3.4 7.3 8.0 21.3 7.3 3.2 
1995-96 -2.4 1.0 3.3    7.5 3.2 
Source: EPW Research Foundation, 1996, Table 4B, 12, 14. 
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Figure 1: Public Sector Savings as a Percentage of GDP 
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Figure 2: Public Sector Capital Formation as a Percentage of GDP 
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Figure 3: Public Sector Expenditure as a Percentage of GDP 
 
Finding 1: Thus it can be concluded that a steady worsening of government finances 
forced a fall in the share of capital formation and employee compensation in the 
public sector, by the late eighties. The ratio of purchase of commodities and services 
to GDP in 1995-96 was about the same as in 1970-71.  
 
Government administration shows the major pathology; therefore this is now 
examined in greater detail. Although savings were negative, current expenditure in 
general administration rose in the eighties (table 2 and figure 4); it was financed by 
borrowings. But both current and capital expenditure on health and education fell 
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from the late eighties (figure 5). Capital expenditure on the latter two categories was 
only 0.14 per cent of GDP in 1994-95; it was always largest in general administration. 
 
Table 2: CURRENT AND CAPITAL EXPENDITURE IN GOVT. ADM. 
Current Expenditure Capital Expenditure.  
Year General 
Adm 
Defence Health Education General 
Adm 
Defence Health Education 
1970-71 2.05 2.85 0.44 2.27 0.34 0.02 0.05 0.06 
1971-72 2.33 3.41 0.50 2.33 0.26 0.01 0.04 0.06 
1972-73 2.33 3.34 0.50 2.51 0.38 0.01 0.04 0.08 
1973-74 1.97 2.81 0.45 2.16 0.66 0.04 0.03 0.07 
1974-75 1.88 2.97 0.45 2.30 0.62 0.04 0.04 0.05 
1975-76 2.03 3.28 0.51 2.52 0.57 0.03 0.05 0.05 
1976-77 2.17 3.17 0.58 2.60 0.35 0.04 0.07 0.07 
1977-78 2.03 2.87 0.59 2.60 0.66 0.01 0.07 0.06 
1980-81 2.12 2.55 0.62 2.75 0.27 0.01 0.07 0.08 
1987-88 2.52 4.03 0.81 3.42 0.41 0.02 0.08 0.11 
1990-91 2.60 3.32 0.77 3.39 0.74 0.01 0.08 0.12 
1991-92 2.66 3.07 0.73 3.44 0.42 0.03 0.07 0.11 
1992-93 2.73 3.00 0.74 3.41 0.22 0.02 0.06 0.09 
1993-94 2.63 3.16 0.72 3.31 0.22 0.02 0.05 0.08 
1994-95 3.13 2.88 0.68 3.26 0.23 0.01 0.05 0.09 
Source: National Accounts Statistic Of India 1950-51 to 1996-97, CSO (Statement No. 35 in NAS 1997).
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Figure 4: Current Expenditure by Govt. Adm. as a Percentage of GDP 
 
Finding 2: Borrowing was necessary to sustain a rise in the share of current 
expenditure in general administration in the mid-eighties. Spending on health and 
education suffered cutbacks in the nineties. The ratio of capital expenditure was 
always low in these two categories and fell in general administration also by the mid - 
eighties. 
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Figure 5: Capital Expenditure by Govt. Adm. as a Percentage of GDP  
 
Since current expenditure includes interest payments, we turn to the income and 
outlay account of administrative departments (table 3 and figure 6). This gives 
consumption and interest payments separately.  
 
Table 3: INCOME AND OUTLAY ACCOUNT OF ADM. DEPTS. (GOVT. ADM.) 
Year Consumption 
Exp. 
Interest on 
public debt
Subsidies Income from 
Entrepreneurship 
and property 
Direct 
taxes 
Indirect 
taxes 
Misc. 
receipts
1970-71 8.81 0.50 0.78 1.33 2.53 8.98 0.38 
1971-72 9.64 0.58 0.91 1.40 2.76 9.76 0.59 
1972-73 9.30 0.68 1.08 1.25 2.88 10.15 0.29 
1973-74 8.22 0.77 1.14 0.88 2.67 9.48 0.24 
1980-81 9.62 1.12 2.32 0.68 2.63 12.31 0.22 
1984-85 10.53 2.16 3.38 1.00 2.51 13.24 0.39 
1990-91 11.54 3.78 3.47 0.75 2.41 14.25 0.39 
1991-92 11.26 4.26 3.67 1.42 2.83 14.05 0.35 
1992-93 11.13 4.30 2.90 1.08 2.92 13.54 0.47 
1993-94 11.11 4.48 2.87 1.03 2.84 12.49 0.53 
1994-95 10.52 4.72 2.68 0.86 3.16 12.68 0.84 
Source: Various issues, National Accounts Statistics, CSO (Statement 43 in 1996). 
 
Table 3 and figure 6 show that even though current expenditure continued to rise from 
the mid-eighties, the ratio of consumption fell from 1988-89 and expenditure on 
subsidies from 1990-91 (figure 6). These figures are for explicit subsidies; it is not 
known how hidden subsidies, comprising low user charges for a variety of public 
goods and services, behaved. A government white paper put these at 70 per cent of 
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total central subsidy. Combined subsidies paid by central and state governments are 
said to be almost 15 per cent of GDP3. The direct tax ratio improved somewhat, but 
indirect taxes that comprise the bulk, fell from the late eighties (figure 7). The rise in 
current expenditure was due to the interest payments on public debt. These have been 
rising from the mid-seventies, showing the cumulative effect of the cost shocks. The 
rise accelerated in the nineties, following the freeing of interest rates (figure 6). This, 
together with the deterioration in the ability to tax, was the culprit that prevented 
improvement in government finances. 
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Figure 6: Expenditure of Adm. Depts. as a Percentage of GDP 
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Figure 7: Income of Adm. Depts. as a Percentage of GDP 
 
Finding 3: Since the eighties the government has not been able to fund its current 
expenditures from current revenues. This led to a cumulative rise in public debt, 
                                                     
3  The figures are from Vinay Pandey (1998) who reports on recent research on subsidies. 
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interest payments, and the revenue deficit. Although investment has been cut the 
most, government consumption has also suffered.  
 
 
Table 4: PRODUCTION ACCOUNT OF NON-DEPTT. 
ENTERPRISE 
 
Year Compensation 
Of employees 
Operating 
Surplus 
1970-71 1.79 1.17 
1974-75 3.00 1.68 
1980-81 4.06 2.23 
1984-85 4.63 3.84 
1990-91 4.68 4.40 
1991-92 4.63 5.21 
1992-93 4.65 5.05 
1993-94 4.43 5.88 
1994-95 4.42 5.76 
Source: Various issues NAS, CSO (Statement 47 in 1996). 
 
 
The large employment in the public sector is often blamed for deteriorating 
government finances. Table 4 and figure 8 offer some evidence that this is too harsh a 
judgement. Although the compensation of employees has risen, the rate of increase 
has been less than in the operating surplus. Here and in Table 1 the ratio of 
compensation of employees to GDP has been falling in the nineties. Non-
departmental enterprises have been the most profitable among government 
organizations. And the government has been able to moderate wage demands 
sufficiently to improve profits. The rate of increase in operating surplus has normally 
exceeded that in wages. Public sector workers have not been powerful enough as an 
interest group, to protect their share in the nineties.  
 
Finding 4: The ratio of compensation of employees to GDP has been falling in the 
nineties, and has been stagnating since the mid-eighties while the ratio of operating 
surplus to GDP in public sector enterprises has continued to rise. 
 
Finding 5: Both current and consumption expenditure of government administration 
shows a peak in the early seventies, and savings show a trough, coinciding with the 
severe cost shocks. 
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Figure 8: Compensation of Employees and Operating Surplus in Non-dept. 
Enterprises as a Percentage of GDP 
 
 
Most categories of government expenditure have fallen implying that vested interest 
groups are not powerful enough to be fully responsible for the deterioration in 
government finances. The rise in borrowing after the period of major cost shocks, 
together with the inability to raise tax ratios, and the widespread fall in the quality of 
provision of public services, suggests the following hypothesis: 
 
Hypothesis 1: The cost shocks of the seventies triggered off a cumulative decline in 
government finances. 
 
There is enough preliminary support for this hypothesis in the budget data to justify 
more comprehensive tests. The rise in interest payments from the late seventies is 
very clear. Two types of further tests are possible. First, using time series data on 
government budget series, wholesale price indices, and broad money the direction of 
causality can be explored. Did revenue deficit raise money supply and cause inflation 
as is implied by the theory of interest groups? Or did cost shocks raise inflation and 
therefore revenue deficit and money supply? Causality tests done with bivariate and 
multivariate variance auto-regressive models provide evidence of the impact of cost 
shocks and inflation on revenue deficit and money supply.  Second, the effects of 
pricing policies following on the cost shocks can be examined for a number of 
disaggregated public sector bodies. This is a promising research project for the future.  
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 But meanwhile theory can help us understand why these outcomes occurred.   
3. Interventions and Incentives 
Officials would like to believe that they are motivated by a desire for the public good, 
and monetary incentives demean the tradition of public service. There are always 
exceptions, but for the average bureaucrat the power that substitutes for the market is 
even more corrupting. Moreover, systematically distorting market signals has adverse 
consequences. After identifying the trends in the data, theories4 that illuminate these 
outcomes will now be examined. 
 
The provision of government services is put under three heads: general 
administration, departmental, and non-departmental enterprises. The latter two charge 
for their products, while the costs of the first have largely to be covered by taxation. It 
is possible to regard the government as a large multi-product public service provider 
(PSP). The voting process determines the ownership of this PSP. Since the poor have 
the largest votes they have to be satisfied for the incumbent to remain in office. 
Therefore selling its products at an affordable price is a major objective of the 
government in a country with a large population of poor. 
 
In itself this is a valid social objective. But in the face of the severe cost shocks of the 
seventies, the way it was implemented led to a distortion of the incentives of the 
government to invest in improving the quality of public services. One consequence 
was a decline in its ability to collect taxes. 
 
The objective of providing government services at affordable prices led to cross-
subsidization both in the provision of specific products and across government 
functions. The famous Ramsey-Boiteux rule derives optimal cross-subsidization by 
maximizing social welfare subject to a budget constraint. It implies that prices should 
differ from marginal cost but the gap should be inversely proportional to elasticities of 
demand. For example, because the poor have a higher elasticity of demand, they 
should be charged lower prices. The rule can take account of other objectives in social 
                                                     
4 Laffont and Tirole (1993) is a thorough treatment of incentives in regulation. Jha (1998) is a good up 
to date text that brings out the implications of new work on incentives for public economics.  
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welfare such as redistribution and the provision of incentives, and has been 
generalized into the theory of optimal non-linear tariffs. But since the government 
budget deficit has been steadily deepening it implies that these theoretical principles 
have not been followed. The budget constraint has been violated; prices have not been 
derived from first principles. Moreover if, because of cross subsidization, the price in 
any sub-market exceeds cost, or if new technology lowers cost or breaks a natural 
monopoly, competitive entry occurs. Government revenues from these sub-sectors fall 
further. 
 
There are two natural extremes in pricing rules that have opposite effects on the 
incentives of a firm to lower cost or improve quality. The first, a price cap, offers high 
powered incentives since the residual profit share lies with the firm. The second, rate 
of return regulation, provides the cost of the service so there is no motivation to 
decrease costs. Moreover as profits from improvements do not stay with the firm 
incentives are low powered. In designing an incentive scheme there is always a trade-
off between rent extraction and providing incentives for additional effort. A price cap 
if low enough extracts all rent, but can still motivate a decrease in costs. But it reduces 
incentives to invest and improve quality. Costs rise with quality so that low-powered 
incentives are required for the provision of quality. Similarly there is a disincentive to 
invest in the presence of price caps because sunk costs made for investment may be 
expropriated. When the budget is not balanced it implies that all the PSP’s rent is 
being extracted. 
 
This is the general theory of cross-subsidization and incentives for a regulated firm. 
But it can help us understand the state of government finances in India. In the face of 
the cost shocks of the seventies, and the social objective to protect the poor, the 
government functioned with price caps for much of the products and services it 
provided. But where it had monopoly power and was servicing the rich, prices were 
raised much above costs of production. There was extensive cross-subsidization. The 
same principles were applied to tax collection. Large groups of people were exempt 
from income tax, for reasons of equity or cost of collection, and rates were raised 
steeply for the rest. Consequently the tax base is very low; moreover evasion became 
pervasive. As the rich found alternatives, the cross-subsidization was not sufficient to 
cover costs. General revenues did not even cover consumption. Budgetary support 
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was insufficient to prevent the deterioration in quality that came with the price caps. 
Poor quality served as a cost that lowered consumption demand. In section 4 specific 
examples that illustrate the working of these principles are examined. 
 
The analysis in this section leads to: 
 
Hypothesis 2: Price controls in the presence of cost shocks lead to systematic 
incentives to lower quality and investment in the public sector. This reduces future 
capacity of the state to tax, invest and provide services. 
4. Interventions and Outcomes 
Outcomes, in different sectors, illustrate the working of these incentives in response to 
the mechanisms that were implemented. 
Electricity: Charges to commercial users are much higher than to domestic 
consumers, in addition there is illicit tapping of electricity. Many states give free 
electricity to farmers. Frequent breakdowns and low voltage have forced the affluent 
to go in for captive power generation, and state electricity boards (SEBS) are in the 
red. The rich found ways to deal with the system and the government lost money. As 
an example, consider Gujarat.  In 1996-97, the cost of supplying one unit of electricity 
was Rs. 1.86; agriculture was charged 21 paise, the domestic consumer 91 paise, and 
industry 2.34 paise. Cross-subsidization did not cover losses5. SEBs in the country 
together lost Rs 10,000 crore in 1997-98, although 4000 crore of subsidies were 
provided by state governments. In India the cost of electricity to industry is three 
times that in France. In developed countries, tariffs are lower for industry than for 
other consumers, as it costs less to supply power to the bulk high voltage consumers. 
When industry sought to escape the high charges and poor quality through captive 
generation, the Gujarat SEB instituted the requirement of a no objection certificate 
without which an industrial unit cannot set up captive power! Nevertheless the share 
of electricity sold to industry had fallen from 62 per cent (1950-51) to 35 per cent in 
1996-97. The share of agriculture has risen partly because a fixed and low tariff 
encouraged overuse of agricultural pumpsets. Countrywide the  latter consume 20 per 
cent of total power generated. Although farmers are favoured, unreliable supply 
                                                     
5 Information from a lecture given by G.B. Desai of Gujrat SEB, at a seminar at MS University Baroda, 
March 1998. 
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makes them unhappy too. In experimental reforms in Rajasthan farmers were willing 
to pay four to five times the usual tariff for assured quality.  
 
Telephones: International call charges are kept high, to subsidize domestic calls. The 
reasoning was to maximize revenue and to protect the poor, on the assumption that 
international calls are a luxury good. But companies formed in America made it 
possible to call from here and pay abroad. Again, the government loses revenue in 
spite of its domestic monopoly. New technology is hastening the process. In 1998 the 
cost of calling America using Internet telephony was Rs 4 per minute but the public 
sector monopoly charged Rs 75 per minute. The newly appointed regulatory 
authority, TRAI, is planning to change this: charges for international and inter-state 
calls are to be lowered, and those for local calls raised. It is also planned to raise fixed 
rental charges. The idea is that this recovers costs while utilization is stimulated by 
lower marginal charges. But in a poor country many potential consumers may not be 
able to afford high hook-up charges. A consumer organization called Grahak Hakka 
Parishad is protesting these changes on the grounds of the additional burden they 
impose on the less well off. A possible solution is to provide more public call booths 
for them. There are arguments that MTNL is a government monopoly that makes fat 
profits at the expense of the consumer. This process clearly demonstrates the political 
economy of price setting: a rise in price is resisted both to protect the poor, and to 
prevent the government monopoly making excessive profits.        
 
Railways: The railways have ostensibly followed average cost pricing (covering 
costs), but the annual contribution to the Depreciation Reserve Fund (DRF) has been 
used to present a falsely reassuring picture, since it was often less than it should have 
been. But from the Fifth Plan the DRF was included in Plan resources, and the 
railways had to pay dividends on withdrawals. Their ability to use this internal 
resource for badly needed investment fell. At the same time budgetary support, as a 
share of total resources available to the railways, fell from 34 per cent in the First Plan 
to 15 per cent in 1993-94. Other economic criteria have been flouted. Freight rates 
have been raised to subsidize passenger travel. The railways have been steadily 
loosing customers to diesel trucks. Since diesel is also subsidized this deals a double 
blow to government revenues, apart from raising pollution levels and freight costs. 
The average rate per passenger kilometer was raised from 4 paise in 1980-81 to 15 
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paise in 1991-92, but the rise in the average rate per tonne kilometer was more over 
the same period (from 10.5 to 35.1 paise), although the demand for the latter category 
is more elastic6. There is great scope for lowering costs and raising revenue by 
adjusting activities to different categories of demand. The 1998 rail budget made a 
start at lowering cross-subsidization by concentrating fare increases on passenger 
traffic.     
 
Education: The low fees and salaries in higher education, and pressures due to 
insufficient expansion in facilities, have led to great deterioration in standards. 
Teaching in Junior colleges in Mumbai, for example, is almost entirely usurped by 
coaching classes that have better teachers and equipment. They charge huge fees that 
are willingly paid, while the colleges wither away. This is also responsible for the 
brain drain as more students go abroad for studies and then settle there; moreover 
students pay enormous sums to foreign universities for a decent education. For 
example, in Delhi University annual college tuition fees have remained at Rs 180 for 
the past five decades; a student pays less than 5 per cent of the total cost of his 
education. But an attempt to raise tuition fees by 200-300 per cent, in response to a 20 
per cent cut in UGC grants, provoked widespread student agitations and had to be 
withdrawn. Other institutions have succeeded with a more gradual rise in fees; 
acceptability demands that such moves are linked to a perceptible improvement in 
quality, and an equitable sharing of burdens. But reasonable need-based subsidies in 
education have a role in the future. Cheap technical education has played a large role 
in developing the labour skills, such as in computer software, that India is becoming 
famous for.   
 
Irrigation: The subsidy for canal irrigation rates is almost 100 per cent. At the same 
time the cost of providing water through public canals has risen steeply7 and quality 
of supply has fallen. Farmers are willing to pay higher rates for irrigation that is more 
flexibly adapted to their needs; they have shown this by switching to tube-well 
irrigation even though they have to pay for the latter. The proliferation of private 
tube-wells (run on subsidized electricity) has adverse externalities, such as lowering 
                                                     
6 See Sriraman (1997) for more data on these issues. 
7 Dhawan (1997) calculates that the cost per hectare of canal irrigation at constant prices increased 
from Rs 488 to Rs 608 over 1980-81 to 1992-93. The data on Bengal come from the field trips made by 
Vikas Rawal in the course of his Ph.D. on irrigation in West Bengal. 
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of the water table. Total consumption of groundwater resources has risen from 4 
million hectare-metres (MHM) in 1970 to 54 MHM in 1998. It is expected to exceed 
the recharge level of 67 MHM by 2005. In nineteenth-century Gujrat wells were 
designed to catch rain and flood water, so that water remained a renewable resource. 
Community, rather than individual, management prevented overexploitation. Such 
practices need to be renewed. Today subsidies tend to be captured by the rich. In West 
Bengal erstwhile landlords have become water-entrepreneurs. They pay a fixed 
electricity charge of Rs 1500, and no sales tax, and then sell water in the surrounding 
area. It is true that the water rates are sometimes regulated by panchayats, and the 
improvement in availability of electricity from the mid-eighties has coincided with a 
large rise in agricultural production. Both electricity and water are essential 
infrastructure but the only way to ensure their long-term supply is by pricing them to 
cover costs and discourage overuse; restructuring and decentralizing delivery 
mechanisms.  
 
Roads and State Transport Units (STUs): Roads constitute a major component of the 
transport sector and are expected to carry 80 per cent of passenger traffic and 50 per 
cent of goods traffic. Out of a total share of transport in the Eighth Plan outlays of 13 
per cent, the share of roads was 23.6. The road network has been expanding steadily 
but remains inadequate both in terms of quality and requirements. The chronically ill 
STUs offer a copy book illustration of the predictions of theory. Financial losses of 
STUs in 1996-97 were 1414 crore, but fare hikes were withheld for political reasons 
and concessions given to different categories amounted to Rs 486.12 crore. Although 
personnel costs increased by 10.95 per cent and material costs by 11.2 per cent, only 
17 of 70 STUs revised fares. Personnel costs account for 46 per cent of revenues and 
material costs 36 per cent. Retrenchment is ruled out. There are other inefficiencies 
responsible for high cost and poor quality.  Although overall fleet utilization was 88 
per cent it was as low as 14.7 per cent in Bihar. But privatization is not the answer. 
The share of STU buses in total buses has fallen from a peak of 48.2 per cent in 1980 
to 26.3 per cent in 1995; but the private transport that has replaced it is ill-regulated, 
hazardous, and ignores non-profit making sectors. There are externalities in the 
provision of cheap and efficient bus services, since they reduce dualism and draw 
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remote areas and the poor into the modern economy. Revitalized STUs have to play a 
major part in this8. 
 
Taxes: The belief that large classes of Indian people were too poor or too deserving to 
pay taxes has led to such a narrow tax base that the Indian tax/GDP ratio (about 17 
per cent) is one of the smallest in the world. The average ratio is about 31 for 
industrial economies and 18 for developing countries. Because a large part of the 
economy is in the unorganized sector where returns are not routinely filed, it is 
believed that Indian GDP is 60 to 100 per cent underestimated. In that case the 
tax/GDP ratio will be even smaller! Low tax collection, low user prices for public 
goods and low returns on public investment severely limit the services the 
government is able to offer. 
 
These examples repeatedly demonstrate the picture of prices held constant in the face 
of cost shocks; coercive but ultimately unsuccessful attempts at cross-subsidization; 
budgetary losses combined with falling investment and quality. If the consequences of 
holding prices constant in the face of adverse cost shocks are understood, clear 
implications follow for policy. Moreover, the acceptability of these changes rises, 
especially if alternatives are adopted to protect the poor.  
 
Policy: In public goods, where there is a tight link between payment and use, a 
gradual rise in user charges will be accepted, if quality is raised simultaneously. Only 
sustainable cross-subsidization should be undertaken; attention must be paid to 
relative demand elasticities as well as redistribution objectives. Institutional 
reorganization will allow services to be varied to offer consumers a menu of price-
quality options.  
 
Joskow (1998, pp54) suggests that for developing country infrastructure `a fixed 
price/price cap mechanism with quality of service and performance norms and 
specific provisions for evaluation and adjustment over time is likely to provide the 
most effective...approach in many cases’. The fixed prices we have followed in India 
need to be adjusted to ensure quality and investment, but maintain pressures to 
decrease costs. The latter is very important because the coercive ways used to 
                                                     
8 Vaidya (1998) reports on research done at CIRT, Pune. 
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maintain cross-subsidization have bred suspicion of the government as an extortionary 
and inefficient organization. It does exploit monopoly power in certain areas, but in 
the aggregate, has not been able to recover costs. If argument here regarding 
incentives is correct, in the restructured framework enhanced revenues will be used 
productively, and will not merely raise government consumption. Apart from price 
caps, one way to lower costs is to invite competition from private parties. But the 
latter also need to be regulated to ensure that they maintain safety standards and 
service some uneconomic sectors as well.   
 
Non-discretionary and non-distorting methods of protecting the poor should be 
adopted. Among these are increasing the productivity of agriculture and maintaining 
the price of basic foods in line with average purchasing power. Food prices serve as a 
standard for all other prices in a poor country. Historically, poverty has risen in the 
short run and inflation in the medium run with food prices. Countries that have 
avoided rising inequality in their developmental periods (for example the USA) have 
been those with plentiful and cheap supply of food. Cheap food is especially 
important for a country with high population density. Managing the nominal exchange 
rate together with gradual agricultural liberalization can achieve the twin objectives of 
giving incentives to farmers and maintaining basic food prices in line with average 
purchasing power (Goyal 1998). Since food price enters all prices this is one nominal 
price that needs to be managed. In an inflationary context, the distinction between 
relative and nominal prices needs to be carefully understood. This policy set offers a 
substitute that can avoid the huge transaction costs and poor targeting that have been 
documented with the working of the public distribution system (PDS) (Dev 1998). It 
has worked more as a price support for farmers than as an income support for the 
poor. Employment guarantee, and other self-targeting schemes, and community 
homes for destitute groups are also substitutes for the PDS. General subsidies for food 
or public goods such as education should be given through a coupon system of 
entitlement.    
 
Gradually filing tax returns should be made compulsory for all working population, 
although all will not be taxed. Linking rights and entitlements to filing tax returns and 
keeping tax rates low will encourage this. The electronic media can be used to 
instruct, enable, and facilitate filing in spite of illiteracy. Computerization will make it 
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possible to build up a database on tax assesses. Eventually it may be possible to even 
have a coupon-based negative income tax9, one of the cleanest ways of alleviating 
severe poverty.  
 
After twenty-nine years America has a balanced budget. The chief feature of fiscal 
reform has been the systematic removal of incentives for wastage. For example, there 
was a shift from matching to block Federal grants for state welfare payments; the 
former motivated the states to overspend. In India awards to states based on filling 
trend non-plan revenue gaps, have rewarded fiscally profligate states. Transfers from 
the rich to the poor states can continue by having higher block grants for the latter; but 
an incentive component can be added linked to fiscal prudence and efficiency. A 
percentage of the transfer should depend on state GDP per capita growth in the last 
year. This will enhance healthy competition among states. At the same time global 
norms should be evolved to prevent unhealthy competitive lowering of tax rates to 
mobile factors such as capital and make harmonization of tax and user charges 
possible. Allowing states to tax services will improve their revenue raising 
capabilities. 
 
Both governments and markets are needed. Either one has serious lacunae without the 
other. The systematic removal of discretionary controls will remove some of the 
disincentives that have corroded and corrupted government. The rationing required if 
prices are kept low invites corruption. But, as has here been argued, some positive 
incentives are also required to improve quality of public goods. There is ongoing 
debate on structures that lead to good governance. Bureaucracies have multiple agents 
and principals, often pulling in opposite directions. Dixit (1996) has suggested that a 
structure in which each principal offers a positive incentive, without simultaneously 
offering disincentives for other tasks the agent has to carry out, gives good results. 
                                                     
9 Wagle (1998) estimates the cost of giving supplemental income to raise the poor above the poverty 
line to be Rs 45,700 crore a year; this is about 50 per cent of the central government’s tax revenue. It 
can only be implemented in phases, and would have to be tied to computerization that makes available 
indirect sources of information on income, such as inputs and consumption, and allows an expansion of 
the tax base. This would minimize conflict over tax assessments. It should be in the form of 
entitlements to health care, education, and food to improve earning power. If it is less than 
Employment Guarantee Scheme wages it would preserve incentives to work and discourage long-term 
dependence. At last the State would be able to redeem promises made in articles 39 and 41 of the 
Constitution, that guarantee the right to work, to education, and to assistance in case of disability. 
These were included in the Directive Principles of State Policy, but were not made judicially 
enforceable since at that time they were deemed economically infeasible.  
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Discretionary checks politicians had imposed acted as a disincentive on the 
bureaucracy’s willingness to meet the demands of the public. 
 
But past choices have left us with a high revenue deficit and public debt that has to be 
lowered, without harming growth. There are ways to do this. First, reorganize to 
improve quality along with a rationalization of user charges. Second, raise public 
investment in infrastructure and in human beings; borrowing if necessary in transition, 
using innovative financial instruments. This is viable because it will raise tax 
prospects in the future. Credit-rating agencies will forgive a rise in fiscal deficit if the 
revenue deficit falls and growth is high. Third, keep interest rates at foreign levels. 
This will lower Indian interest rates, prevent exchange rate volatility, and help the 
government borrowing programme. Fourth, use supply side policies to keep inflation 
low. Low interest and high growth rates are the fastest way to reduce the debt GDP 
ratio.  
 
5. Concluding Remarks 
In Greek plays tragedy was never purely the outcome of fate; human motivations 
entered richly and often fatally. There was no villainy, however, only frailty. In an 
analogous way, the means used to achieve valid objectives amplified the exogenous 
shocks of the seventies. It was doubly unfortunate because there were no villains; 
players often had the best of intentions. The controls and corruption that resulted were 
not inevitable or intrinsic. Markets are required not to free greed but to free the 
individual, and if freedom is then used to develop character rather than self-
indulgence, greater market incentives will not give a further boost to corruption.  
 
Better alternatives are available to achieve a just society. Understanding the cause for 
the pervasive decline in quality will make a reversal easier. A pricing policy of public 
goods that provides incentives to increase quality and investment while lowering costs 
will be more easily accepted. It will then be possible for political parties and state 
governments to come together and act on this platform. The process would be helped 
by macroeconomic policies that keep interest rates low and prevent exchange rate 
volatility, while supply side policies keep inflation low. A correction of the perverse 
 21
incentives that have corroded the system is a dramatic reversal that can turn tragedy 
into prosperity. 
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